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BOOK REVIEWS
A Study of Law Administration in Connecticut By Charles E. Clark
and Harry Shulman. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1937.
Pp. xiii, 239. $3.00.
This study was undertaken twelve years ago, when the statistical
method was first being applied, with somewhat extravagant expectations, to the problems of judicial administration. It was supposed that
an exhaustive analysis of all the data appearing upon court records
would give a clear and accurate picture of what the courts were doing
and how they were doing it, and that this would supply sufficient information for thoroughly testing the efficiency of the courts and determining what changes in organization or procedure might bring about
improvements in the judicial system.
But the information found in court records covers an exceedingly
wide range, and while some of it relates very directly to judicial administration, a large part of it relates entirely to the social and economic
conditions of modem life. This is quite clearly shown in the book
under review.
Thus, we learn, on the one hand, how many cases, of 26 designated
types, were adjudicated by the Superior Courts of New Haven and
Waterbury in each of 14 years, together with the rate of increase in
the case load for each type during each year of the period; how long
the cases of each type remained pending; how many cases of certain
types were terminated with, and how many without, consideration by
the court; how many of each type were tried with juries; how many
appeals were taken and the results thereof; how many summary judgments were rendered. These are matters relating to court operation.
On the other hand, we learn in the chapter on Divorce, how many
decrees were sought on each of the available grounds; that the number
of cases fluctuated irregularly from year to year without definite trend;
that wives were complainants twice as frequently as husbands; that
the fourth year of marriage was more likely than any other to bring a
suit for divorce, but that the cause of divorce was most likely to have
arisen in the first year; that in 53.4% of the cases there were no
children shown by the record, in 24.2% of the cases there was one
child, and in 13.1% of the cases there were two children, and that the
children were about equally divided according to sex; that cruelty was
predominantly a husband's fault and a wife's complaint, while adultery
was predominantly a wife's fault and a husband's complaint; that husbands behave relatively better in the later years of marriage; that the

BOOK REVIEWS
proportion of suits brought by wives diminished with the length of the
interval after marriage; that the older the marriage the more common
was desertion as a ground, while the reverse was true of cruelty; that
the interval between cause of suit and bringing of suit varied with the
grounds alleged; and that only 9% of the cases which resulted in decrees were contested. These items have practically nothing to do with
court administration. They relate almost solely to the conditions which
affect the institution of marriage.
Similar data has been assembled regarding the foreclosure of mortgages, part of it relating to the processes of litigation but much of it
dealing entirely with the social, economic and financial aspects of mortgage transactions. The material relative to criminal cases is of the
same character.
Since data of both of these types is presented with equal fullness
and detail, the content of the book hardly justifies the title. The book
is not a study of law adminisration. Neither is it a study of the social
or economic relations which produce litigation. It draws no conclusions of any kind. What it does is to demonstrate the availability of the
statistical method for assembling and preserving, in convenient form,
the varied data found in court records. It suggests the possibility of
amplifying those records by including additional items. At the same
time it makes clear the necessity for developing better methods of
keeping records, which will reduce to a minimum the labor of classifying the items and of presenting the results in the form of statistical
tables which can be published and made widely accessible.
How such statistical material will be utilized the authors do not
undertake to suggest. But it is clear that it will furnish only one line
of approach to the solution of the problems with which it deals,--a
line which must be supplemented by other methods of investigation.
As to its value they make no claims. But they warn against over-confidence in the results of any purely statistical studies.
EDsoN R. SUNDERLAND.

University of Michigan Law School,
Ann Arbor, Mich.
The Constitution And What It Means Today. Fifth Revised Edition.
By Edward S. Corwin. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1937. Pp. xxiv, 193. $2.00.
Interpreting The Constitution. By William Draper Lewis. Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company. 1937. Pp. vi, 117. $2.00.
Professor Corwin's book consists of a short gloss upon each successive clause in the Constitution. Written for laymen, the book simply
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and without confusing detail expounds today's Constitution. To relate
the written document to the going governmental institutions of today,
Professor Corwin finds little need for textual exegesis. Rather, he draws
upon history, upon court decisions and judicial doctrines, and upon
governmental practice. Thus he emphasizes how small a part the
words of the written Constitution play in the decision of constitutional
questions and stresses the judges' freedom of choice and the essentially
political character of their function.
Mr. Lewis's book, which comprises his 1937 lectures under the
William H. White Foundation at the University of Virginia, is not so
specifically directed to non-lawyers. It considers why an official interpreter of the Constitution is necessary, why the framers failed to provide for one, how the Supreme Court has come to be recognized as the
official interpreter, what factors influence it, and the problems it faces
today.
The judges' freedom to exercise essentially political choices is especially great, Mr. Lewis points out in his final chapter, with respect
to the principal constitutional problems of today. A widely-held opinion
calls for the abandonment of laissez-faire and holds that the states cannot effectively supply the needed regulation of economic affairs. The
answers to the questions whether government, state or national, may regulate the prices of commodities and services and whether the national
government may regulate production and may itself carry on business
depend upon the meanings to be attributed to those vaguest of constitutional provisions, the due process clauses, the commerce clause, and
the taxing-spending-general welfare clause.
The glosses on these clauses in Professor Corwin's little book are
too short to make the book an adequate substitute, for lawyers and law
students, for his other writings. But lawyers and law students will.find
this book valuable. Because the greater part-and the more important
part-of our constitutional law involves but a few of the many clauses
in the Constitution and derives but little from the wording of those
clauses, lawyers and law students rarely turn to the document itself.
They are too often uninformed about the construction placed by the
courts or by governmental practice upon nine-tenths of the clauses in the
document. Professor Corwin's 'book is well adapted to enabling them to
inform themselves about these clauses.'
'A few of Professor Corwin's statements trouble the reviewer:

(a) At page 55 it is stated that the obligation of contracts clause no longer
interferes seriously with state power to protect the public health, safety, or morals
or to promote the general welfare "for the simple reason that the State has no
power to bargain away this power." To the reviewer, this is not a "simple" rea-

son, because it is difficult to find a satisfactory reason for the inability of the state
to bargain away the power. Moreover, it affords a rationalization of the validity
of state statutes interfering with prior contracts to which the state was a party,
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Because the judges have such great freedom of choice and thus
exercise an essentially political function when they decide constitutional
issues, the questions Mr. Lewis discusses are fundamental to an understanding and for an appraisal of our governmental system.
The framers, Mr. Lewis believes, realized the necessity, in a federal
government, for an authoritative official interpreter of the Constitution.
They feared that if they designated one, a wrangle would ensue which
might prevent the adoption of the Constitution. They were content
to make no designation because they believed that the role would be
assumed by congress or the Supreme Court; they cared little which did
assume it, the important thing being that final interpretative power be
not left to the states.
Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison,2 claimed the r6le for the Supreme
Court. This, Mr. Lewis thinks, Marshall's background made inevitable.
The social and political philosophies of the judges necessarily influence
their choice between different interpretations of the document and thus
necessarily influence our constitutional law. Hence, the danger from
the practice of appointing to the Supreme Court successful practitioners,
who usually (Mr. Lewis believes) have acquired the conservative views
of their wealthy clients. Yet M'Culloch v. Maryland3 and Gibbons v.
Ogden4 show that decisions reflecting opinions of the more conservative
classes, not held by the majority, may be for the best interests of the
nation.
but not, as stated on page 57, of the validity of state statutes interfering with
contracts to which the state was not a party. Cf. the more satisfactory rationalizations used 'by Daniels, J., in The West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507,
12 L. ed. 535 (U. S. 1848).
(b) At page 110 it is stated that "The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated, and hence a limited power...."
The meaning of this is not apparent.
(c) At page 112, after a clear statement of the relation between the supremacy
clause of Article VI and the Tenth Amendment, it is said that the national government may not "press its otherwise constitutional measures to the extent of
menacing the right of the peoples of the States to maintain effective governments
for State purposes." The reviewer would like to see an elaboration of this concession by the arch-opponent of "dual federalism" as a test of national powers.
(d) The gloss on Amendment V (page 124 ff.) contains no suggestion that
there is less historical wariant for construing the due process clause of that
amendment to apply to substantive law as well as to procedure than there is with
respect to the due process clause of Amendment XIV.
(e) At pages 138-139 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 504, 33
L. ed. 842 (1890) is cited for the proposition that Amendment XI protects a
state against suits for debts brought by its own citizens. Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U. S.. 313, 54 Sup. Ct 745, 78 L. ed. 1282 (1934) now reexplains the Hans
case and does not rest its doctrine on Amendment XI.
Lawyers will find irritating the fact that the notes are segregated at the end
of the book instead of being printed at the bottom of each page. Moreover, the
dates of cases are not given.
2 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. ed. 60 (U. S. 1803).
34 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
'9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824).
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In tracing the history of the acceptance of the Supreme Court as
the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, Mr. Lewis distinguishes
between acceptance by non-official parties to litigation, official parties
to litigation, the president, congress, and the states. He shows that not
until the Civil War was there an end to state refusals to accept. Justices of the Supreme Court, he points out, do not always prefer their
predecessors' interpretations to their own. He believes that members
of congress, and the president, should not feel bound to subordinate
their interpretations to the Court's, though they should realize the
futility of their refusing to accept the Court's interpretation in the absence of reasonable ground to believe that the Court will no longer
adhere thereto.
After considering the principal constitutional problems of today
and stressing the freedom of choice of the judges with respect to them,
Mr. Lewis wisely observes that what may shock the general sense of
justice this year, may not do so next year. Though Mr. Lewis does
not point the moral, his whole book seems to the reviewer to counsel
judicial tolerance and self-limitation.
DOUGLAS

B. MAUGS.

Duke Law School,
Durham, N. C.
The Mind of the Juror. By Albert S. Osborn. New York: The
Author. 1937. Pp. xv, 239. Library Edition, $4.00; Student
Edition, $3.50.
This volume contains much accurate and interesting information as
to all phases of jury trials and presents some excellent suggestions for
the improvement of such trials; but to find this information and these
suggestions the reader must plow through a large amount of unsound,
impractical and unordered reading matter. On the whole this laborious
plowing is probably worth the trouble.
There are two principal criticisms of the book. The first is that it
assumes dogmatically that in every case tried before a jury one side is
right and the other side is "against the facts". Those familiar with
jury trials know that in many, and probably most, cases there is no
absolute right side or wrong side, since the questions involved are
questions of degree; for example, personal injury actions which present
the questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and damages. The
explanation of the author's rigid classification probably lies in the fact
that his principal experience has been with cases involving the handwriting or execution of contested papers; in which cases there is usually
an absolute right side and wrong side.
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By his faulty premise the author is led to inject into most of his
chapters certain suggested reforms (some of them most impractical)
which are designed to hamper the lawyer who is seeking to prevail
against the facts. Not only do these injections make the book more a
treatise upon jury system reform than an analysis of the juror's mind,
but also they destroy the continuity and logical presentation of most
of the subjects referred to in the chapter headings. The result is
that, just when the reader strikes an interesting discussion of the actual
jury system, he has his mind rudely shaken by a repetition of the
author's criticism of the jury system or by a new recital of the proposed reforms.
On the other hand the book has some excellent features. The
chapter on "Tactful Tactics" clearly presents the successful trial
lawyer's general conduct of a case. Of equal merit are the chapters
entitled "Steps Toward Persuasion" and "Summing Up, Argument and
Oratory". In fact, nearly all of the last thirteen chapters (out of a
total of thirty-three) are interesting, sound, and instructive. There is a
possible exception in the case of the chapter on "Cross-examination",
which chapter is quite amateurish.
Among the several reforms of the jury system proposed by the
author at least three are convincingly presented. The necessity for a
better class of jurors is brought out in a forceful and interesting manner.
The author suggests specific and practical means of improving this
condition, to-wit, by a more careful selection of the jury panel, and by
an abolition of the many jury exemptions and excuses.
The old controversy (within and without the bar) as to whether a
trial judge should be permitted to express his opinion upon the facts
is again brought forward; and the author makes out an excellent case
for the federal and New Jersey systems which permit such expressions
by the presiding judge.
Finally, most convincing reasons are offered for requiring the concurrence of only ten of the twelve jurors in the rendition of a verdict.
It is pointed out that this change would not only eliminate many jury
disagreements but would also deprive the obstinate juror of an opportunity to obtain an unfair verdict by his mere obstinacy or prejudice.
The last four chapters of the book present a subject only partially
connected with the other chapters-the punishment of crime in America.
After drawing a graphic and alarming picture of present crime conditions, particularly in our large cities, the author calls upon the bar and

the public for a common-sense attitude toward crime and its effective
punishment. He deplores the close association between certain criminal
lawyers and their clients; and he suggest the elimination of the delays

